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Reintermediation 
Jon M. Garon 
Hamline University School of Law, 
1536 Hewitt Ave., St. Paul, MN 55104, USA 
E-mail: jgaron01@gw.hamline.edu 
Abstract: The digital revolution has interrupted traditional supply chains and 
wholesaler relationships with manufacturers and retailers, companies are 
developing new methodologies to create supplier loyalty critical to control of 
market share. This article documents the leading strategies being utilised by 
companies to reassert their relevance in the value proposition for their clients 
and the consequences of these new business models on intellectual property 
law, privacy rules and influences on judicial contract interpretation. In Philip 
Evans and Thomas Wurster’s bestselling book, Blown to Bits (Harvard 
Business Press, 1999), the authors postulated that the inverse relationship 
between the richness and reach of content was eliminated by the extremely low 
transaction costs associated with providing consumers highly rich content 
through digital media. Successful companies have employed reintermediation, 
the use of proprietary sales channels and exclusive intellectual property-
protected techniques to establish brand loyalty, enforce brand exclusivity and 
command market-share. 
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end user license agreements; EULA; exclusivity. 
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Biographical notes: Jon Garon (BA University of Minnesota; JD Columbia 
University School of Law) is a nationally recognised authority on intellectual 
property, particularly copyright law and entertainment and media law. When he 
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as Professor of Law after stepping down from his position as Dean. After a 
year-long sabbatical during which he will lecture internationally in locations 
including China and Israel, he will return to the Hamline classroom in 2009. 
 
1 Introduction 
The prevalent pattern for 21st century industry has been shaped by the changing nature of 
the relationship between manufacturers, distributors and consumers. Through virtual 
worlds, social networks and video sharing websites, the traditional pipeline of  
producer-to-distributor and distributor-to-consumer has re-emerged as a spider web of 
interrelations between manufacturer to the consumer; distributor-to-consumer and 
increasingly consumer-to-consumer. For many companies, the change in relationships 
from the 20th century reliance on regional distributors and knowledgeable resellers of 
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goods to a system of computer-mediated supply chains and direct-to-consumer 
information has radically altered the relationship between manufacturers and consumers. 
A few leading companies have embraced strategies to maximise this change and increase 
market share. The vast majority of their competitors are floundering without a clear 
understanding of the change. 
Those embracing the new paradigm are utilising trademarks, copyright, patents and 
contract licensing strategies to further tilt the game in their favour. Although a few of 
these strategies might implicate competition law or antitrust law concerns, most of these 
companies are operating within the rather lax regulatory system currently in place. For 
the successful companies, the use of proprietary sales channels and exclusive intellectual 
property-protected techniques are re-emerging as critical tools to establish brand loyalty, 
enforce brand exclusivity and command market-share. This article documents the leading 
strategies being utilised by companies to reassert their relevance in the value proposition 
for their customers and the consequences of these new business models on intellectual 
property law, privacy rules and influences on judicial contract interpretation. 
2 Disintermediation revisited 
In October 1997, Philip Evans and Thomas Wurster published Strategy and the New 
Economics of Information1 and later expanded the thesis for the book, Blown to Bits2. 
They studied how the internet’s informational flow fundamentally reshaped the 
relationships between consumers and retailers, and among businesses.3 Evans and 
Wurster posit that information is the ‘glue’ which holds corporate supply chains and 
consumer relationships together.4 By controlling the flow of information, companies tend 
to keep the supply chains linked. Unglue information content from the delivery 
mechanism for that content and old business alliances unravel. As the internet has 
allowed consumers to get information from a multiplicity of sources – including each 
other – the dominance of the manufacturer and supplier has dwindled. In their place, 
socially networked sources such as Craig’s List5 and Angie’s List6 provide consumers the 
feedback information they desire. In response, companies such as Microsoft have 
attempted to capture the user-generated content by hosting feedback bulletin boards in 
which users can provide technical assistance to other users under the auspices of the 
supplying manufacturer.7 
The second phenomena identified by Evans and Wurster is the inverse relationship 
between ‘richness’ and ‘reach’.8 Rich represents the size of the audience ‘exchanging 
information’.9 Richness is comprised of three elements: bandwidth, customisation and 
interactivity.10 Rich content is highly interactive, readily customisable and able to flow in 
large amounts. Historically, rich content had very limited reach. A teacher in a small 
class had great richness but the reach was limited. As the class size grew and reach 
improved, the customisation decreased as did the interactivity, making larger classes less 
rich than smaller classes. 
Before digital communications, richness and reach were inversely related, with the 
improvement in one coming at the cost of the other. With modern digital technology, the 
bandwidth limitations that made for this inverse relationship have eroded. While there 
remain significant costs to the creation of interactive and highly customisable content, the 
delivery costs are dramatically reduced with digital distribution technologies such as 
websites, ftp protocols, virtual worlds, video-games and peer-to-peer networks. 
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Moreover, since the consumer is generally paying the cost to acquire high speed capacity 
on their computers and portable devices, the public has further reduced the cost to the 
manufacturers by undertaking this burden directly. 
In the decade, following the Evans and Wurster’s initial article, the newspapers have 
faltered and the retail giants have struggled to maintain market share. The economies of 
scale that dictated their success have been eroded by consumer alternatives for 
information, pricing competition and convenience. Inevitably, these changes will 
influence an ever increasing array of goods and services as the richness of face-to-face 
communications is replicated with ubiquitous reach to a growing customer base. The 
audience migration to digital music and internet video highlights the importance 
accelerated disintermediation of media from traditional distribution channels. Today, 
iTunes is the largest distributor of digital music, followed by Amazon in a distant second 
place.11 Amazon also ships physical copies, however, giving it a second revenue stream 
and making it a more legitimate competitor to Apple. In contrast, national retailers like 
Tower Records have collapsed from a lack of relevance to customers and the inability to 
add richness in a commodity transaction.12 
Music sales through a digital download represents the ultimate exemplar of media 
disintermediation. Historically, the pricing of a musical track was related to the physical 
distribution of the song embodied in a medium such as an LP or a CD. A physical CD’s 
price incorporates manufacturing, shipping, shelving and return costs. Digital distribution 
replaces these costs with a substantially lower expense for maintaining the online 
distribution channel. For music distribution, 2008 has marked the rise of iTunes to the 
largest channel for retail music distribution, overtaking Wal-Mart in February 2008 
according to NPD Group.13 Apple has sold over three billion tracks since entering the 
market in 2003, building its lead in music distribution through the combination of its 
extremely popular iPod line, elegant software and proprietary formatting. Apple has 
become more open about its digital rights management, selling DRM-free tracks, but only 
after it attained dominant market supremacy. 
The iTunes store, of course, has significant capital and operating costs to maintain its 
worldwide retail market. The scalability of the website allows the costs of maintaining a 
web presence to be distributed over a substantially larger user population. All steps of the 
middlemen were eliminated. Pressing, packaging, shipping and related businesses were 
dropped from the iTunes distribution. Sales of tracks utilising both iTunes and traditional 
stores continue to have the costs associated with package design and album content, but 
artists may choose to release singles, avoiding these costs entirely. 
Traditional record store retailers can no longer provide the richness which kept them 
competitive. Although, the local record store provides a highly interactive and 
customisable experience, it pales in comparison to the breadth of content available on 
iTunes and the depth of knowledge available through a combination of iTunes and  
music-related social networks on the internet. Niche marketers can overcome this by 
narrowly targeting their audience and increasing the richness of the efforts. Ritmo Latino, 
for example, caters to first generation US Hispanics. According to its owner, ‘It is not 
that we open a general [music] store and want to capture some of the Hispanic people… 
[w]e cater [only] to Hispanic people’.14 The strategy continues to work. Jim Donio, 
President of the National Association of Recording Merchandisers added, ‘[y]ou have to 
make it a place where people want to come back over and over again; you have to be part 
of your community’.15 Some musicians are taking the disintermediation a step further, 
selling tracks from their personal websites or from widgets on MySpace pages.16 
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Newspapers are suffering the same fate. Newspaper revenues have dropped 
dramatically as advertiser-funded online content has made those authorities of 
information fight for legitimacy with blogs and compete with each other unaided by the 
local monopolies available in most print markets.17 Real estate advertisers – the largest 
advertising category for newspapers – ‘want a direct relationship with their clients’, 
Borrell analyst Andrew Martin said. ‘It shows signs of disintermediating all commercial 
advertising for real estate’.18 
3 Exclusivity as the antidote to irrelevance – the practice of 
reintermediation 
The response to disintermediation is relevance, affinity and exclusivity.19 The use of 
copyright and patent can create exclusivity that serves to develop exclusive channels of 
distribution. Exclusivity can be achieved by contract, such as the long-term service 
agreements demanded by many US mobile phone companies.20 But these agreements are 
seen as coercive by the public, eroding affinity rather than building relationships.21 
Effective reintermediation strategy uses exclusivity to improve affinity. 
Affinity built on exclusivity can be difficult to maintain. Both Apple and Microsoft, 
for example, have developed proprietary digital rights management systems (DRM) that 
are incompatible and therefore require users of their music players – iPods and Zunes, 
respectively – to purchase content that has only their own DRM coding. No challenges to 
this proprietary regime have been raised in the USA, but there were substantial 
complaints by European Union members against Apple for its lack of interoperability.22 
Apple’s proprietary DRM system was integrated with the launch of the iPod, the iTunes 
software and the iTunes store. The combination created a bundled music delivery system 
that muscled its competitors off the consumer’s computer screen. The combination of 
these three elements worked astonishingly well, redefining the music business and 
software industry at the same time. 
To soften public criticism of Apple’s proprietary Fair Play DRM software, Steven 
Jobs has decried the failure of DRM for music, suggesting that Apple would quit if it 
were not forced into unilateral disarmament. ‘Imagine a world where every online store 
sells DRM-free music encoded in open licensable formats. In such a world any store can 
sell music which is playable on all players. This is clearly the best alternative for 
consumers, and Apple would embrace it in a heartbeat’.23 
The sentiment expressed reflects Apple Chairman Jobs’ crying crocodile tears from 
his vantage point atop the digital download industry. With a dominant position in both 
the sales of the players and content, Apple needs to avoid the public perception as 
favouring proprietary or consumer-unfriendly products. Despite Jobs’ comments on 
DRM, Apple has always embraced a wholly proprietary strategy. It has refused to license 
its computer operating system, protecting 100% of the Apple software and hardware 
business rather than chasing a larger market share in either field. In fact, it continues to 
challenge third party manufacturers who attempt to make their equipment compatible 
with Apple’s software.24 
The most recent example of Google’s reintermediation strategy is called Lively,25 a 
beta 3D virtual environment platform. Although behind Second Life, Google has a 
history of catching up. Moreover, the platform’s browser-based approach will allow it to 
insinuate itself into small and large applications – putting Google between the consumer 
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and the advertiser in a host of new environments. Given the ubiquity of Google, 
consumers tend to think of it as a utility rather an advertising platform. Just like ‘free’ 
broadcast television, however, Google’s strategy is simple: be the first choice for 
consumer interaction and sell that interaction to advertisers – just as newspapers filled 
that role in the previous century. Google’s tools are not free; they are advertiser 
supported. Under this business model, the extension into virtual worlds represents a 
natural extension of its reintermediation strategy. And given the strategy, the extension 
into virtual worlds will grow, expand and move from a curiosity to an essential tool 
because Google cannot afford to allow any other advertising company to gain a foothold 
in a marketing sphere. 
4 Reintermediation for proprietary strategies for market dominance 
Reintermediation strategy utilises contracting strategies, consumer data information and 
structural business approaches to encourage additional steps in the consumer transaction 
which build an ongoing relationship between the enterprise and the consumer. A 
comparison of the strategies adopted by Amazon and Apple demonstrates how a resellers 
use the legal and business tools available to redefine the consumer experience. 
4.1 Amazon’s reordering of the publishing industry 
Amazon.com has moved the furthest to introduce its reintermediation strategy, creating 
an intuitive user interface which pulls consumers into the website with highly customised 
e-mail communications and an equally customised home page; a proprietary product 
distribution device and increasingly control over products sold on its platform. 
The business strategy begins with the home page website, designed to shape the 
behaviour of its users and build a strong reliance on its information. Most of the Amazon 
home page provides product recommendations based on the viewing history of the 
consumer. Amazon uses the private data to tailor the recommendations very closely to the 
consumer’s most recent shopping history. These recommendations tend to shorten the 
time a consumer must spend finding relevant products. By shortening the search time, 
Amazon is trying to increase the probability that the time spent online will result in a 
completed transaction. 
Amazon also recognises that consumers have close to perfect pricing information 
(thanks to Google) and therefore price their products and shipping costs to be the same or 
below their major competitors. Amazon builds on the information provided by publishers 
and manufacturers with consumer reviews and aggregate consumer behaviour data. This 
allows a customer to see if there are other consumers choosing a competing product. At 
worst, this emphasises the herd mentality of the public, but at best it allows the customer 
to improve the reliability of his or her partial product information. The consumer does not 
need to learn everything about a product to make a purchase. A small amount of 
information combined with strong behavioural data will tell the consumer he or she is 
making the correct choice regarding the product. 
The cumulative impact of Amazon’s user interface makes the information more 
robust than most reference librarians can provide for their face-to-face patrons. As a 
result, the Amazon interaction combines universal reach with rich content of 
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customisable, interactive and high-bandwidth – the embodiment of Evans and Wurster’s 
predictions. 
The website interaction is just the first step in Amazon’s reintermediation strategy. 
Amazon experienced its own iPod moment over the past year with the highly successful 
launch of its e-book reader Kindle.26 The Kindle quickly exceeded expectations, selling 
out only hours after launch.27 Also like Apple, Kindle uses a proprietary e-book format. 
Moreover, Kindle’s primary selling feature further reinforces the exclusivity of 
distribution sought by Amazon. The machine allows a reader to contact Amazon directly 
from the device, without the need to synchronise on a computer, making purchases 
directly from the device.28 The elimination of the synchronising computer makes the 
Kindle even more dominant than the iPod has been for music as a sole-source mediator of 
content. 
Despite the small portion of the market in e-books, publishers are nervous about the 
potential impact Amazon may have. Publishing executives ‘fear Amazon’s still-growing 
power as a bookseller. Those executives note that Amazon currently sells most of its 
Kindle books to customers for a price well below what it pays publishers, and they 
anticipate that it will not be long before Amazon begins using the Kindle’s popularity as 
a lever to demand that publishers cut prices’.29 Companies are buoyed by Amazon 
statements that users of Kindles are not purchasing fewer print books and the device may 
be increasing overall title sales.30 Publishers are significantly increasing the number of 
titles released as e-books.31 
Amazon is growing its strategy by increasing its control on book publishing as well. 
In March 2008, it announced a new policy under which all print-on-demand books 
distributed though Amazon must be manufactured through Amazon’s print on demand 
system.32 Using Amazon’s BookSurge print-on-demand subsidiary, an author can create a 
book, have an e-book formatted for Kindle and have the print-on-demand catalogued and 
sold on Amazon.com. 
Organisations such as the Author’s Guild and the Independent Publishers Association 
have raised concerns that this will lead to unreasonable market dominance for Amazon, 
making other print-on-demand distributors largely redundant and likely to disappear.33 At 
that point, authors are concerned that Amazon.com will use the market dominance to 
drop royalty rates and significantly raise production costs for these self-published 
authors. Amazon uses its 1-Click ordering service to promote – or demote – various 
suppliers as a method of pressuring its suppliers for favourable terms.34 
For the consumer, the Kindle and the other services move both the consumer and the 
author towards a relationship of extreme reliance on Amazon. Owners of Kindles will not 
purchase e-books elsewhere because they would lose the wireless benefits of the reader. 
Authors, musicians and filmmakers using Amazon’s services will strongly encourage 
their fans to buy on Amazon, maximising the revenue for both parties. Amazon then uses 
this market share to reduce costs of content acquisition. For suppliers, Amazon is 
increasingly proprietary, but is softening this threat with a host of marketing incentives to 
create a positive, symbiotic relationship. For the consumer, the relationship is entirely 
non-exclusive, built on highly customised, interactive rich content. 
Amazon influence has already stressed the business practices within the publishing 
industry. HarperCollins has announced a substantially new business model under which 
advances will be reduced, retailers will no longer be able to return unsold books and 
authors will be compensated with a larger share of royalties in lieu of the current 
guarantee system.35 Under the new arrangement, the company would provide 50% 
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royalties in lieu of any advance.36 The new imprint shifts the financial risk of publishing 
from the publisher to the author and retailer, mimicking the model being developed by 
Amazon. 
The reaction to the shifting publishing market by HarperCollins reflects the marginal 
disruption point in the industry. If Amazon – or any combination of factors – undermines 
the profitability of traditional publishing, then the existing structure of author advances, 
publisher print runs, bookstore displays and publisher buy-backs of overruns will be 
wiped out by the more efficient print-on-demand and e-book model that rewards actual 
sales. Undoubtedly, this will result in shallower purchases by the retailer and fewer 
returns, threatening discount book and remainder business as well. This model will, of 
course, be much more efficient. It also means that there will be less incentive or funding 
for developing the marketability of new writers and further accelerate the decline of the 
publishing industry. 
4.2 Apple’s continued proprietary strategy 
In comparison to Amazon’s reintermediation approach, Apple has always invested in a 
proprietary strategy built to avoid commoditisation of its products. As IBM created and 
then lost the personal computing business, Apple competed from afar, never gaining 
significant market share but never risking the devastating commodity pricing that 
destroyed many of the earlier computer companies.37 Apple continues to struggle to 
distinguish itself in the competitive computer market. 
At the same time, Apple has a host of successful software products and its iPod gave 
the podcasting phenomenon its name. Although music and video players have become 
commodities, Apple continues to dominate the market with an innovative product design, 
unique interface and proprietary DRM. But its own success may make it difficult to 
continue saturating that market. The explosive extension into the mobile telephone 
business has placed Apple in a much more competitive, high-stakes race. Moreover, as a 
phone manufacturer it is forced to partner with mobile phone providers, which reduces its 
exclusive relationship with its clients. 
Apple continues to seek the larger markets of home computers and home networks. 
Using the ubiquity of the iTunes software base, Apple used the semi-automated update 
features of its program to introduce the Apple Safari Internet browser into the Windows 
market. Users of iTunes found that Safari would automatically install on their computers 
as part of an iTunes software update unless the user unchecked an installation approval 
box. Whether this distribution is sufficient to gain significant market share remains to be 
seen, but it is unquestionably more efficient than expecting each potential user to seek out 
the Apple installation page to download the software. 
The tying relationship between the iTunes operating software and Apple browser 
harkens back to the start of the disintermediation phenomenon in 1995 when Microsoft 
used its dominance in desktop operating systems to steal browser market share from 
Netscape.38 Apple did not integrate the Safari software directly into iTunes, and thus 
avoided a claim of illegal tying, but by making the installation of the browser software a 
default action for the millions of iPod users, Apple is moving to increase consumer 
reliance on its software and away from both Microsoft and the other browser providers. 
The Safari feint is part of Apple’s larger strategy to keep undermining Microsoft’s 
hegemony over the desktop and laptop computer. Relentlessly, Apple will keep pushing 
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the message that if you like our music player, our phone, our browser, you should buy 
our laptop and desktop computers. 
4.3 The battle for movies and television 
The ultimate battleground for entertainment market is the home movie and television 
delivery industry where the cable monopoly is eroding.39 The companies that can win the 
affinity for set-top relationships will gain a tremendous portion of advertising revenue 
and brand superiority. Apple joined the battle with Apple TV in 2007, but had no market 
impact.40 Apple has been trying to extend its iTunes service to the home theatre for years. 
Steve Jobs admitted the emphasis on the home movie business. ‘We’ve all missed. No 
one has succeeded yet ...’41 Sony and Microsoft each announced strategies to expand 
motion picture distribution directly to the consumer using their videogame stations.42 In 
the case of Microsoft, the Xbox 360 will stream Netflix’s on demand movies and 
television shows directly from the console.43 Sony’s films and television programs can be 
transferred to a PlayStation Portable (PSP), allowing the PlayStation to compete with 
Apple’s iPhone and iPod touch. 
In the set-top battles, the difference between a proprietary strategy and a 
reintermediation strategy becomes clear. Like Amazon, Netflix’s use of social 
networking builds a strong audience base, and to the extent that consumers can rely on 
the recommendations, it will have an important place in the living room. The 
arrangement with Microsoft nicely benefits both companies, increasing Netflix’s reach 
and allowing Microsoft up from the kid’s basement or out of the office and into the living 
room as well. 
Apple cannot use its consumer electronics clout to gain command of the television 
set-top box because Apple has failed to translate its proprietary strategy into a 
reintermediation strategy. ‘If my iPod is separate from my TV, then why use my iPod?’ 
Television is associated with the Xbox or PlayStation, not the music player. Were an iPod 
to ‘talk’ with the TV, so that all the movies downloaded on the iPod were synched with 
the TV, then Apple would have a strategy of reintermediation. The iPods’ ability to 
become personal playlists for any connected television would result in households with 
Apple TV and separate iPods for each family member. Merely having the iTunes 
software is not nearly enough. 
5 The legal limits of reintermediation 
Reintermediation relies upon customer affinity and behaviour of repeated reliance on a 
particular company to the exclusion of all other providers of that good or service. The 
exclusivity may have no legally enforceable parameters or it may be based on either 
exclusive dealing contracts or intellectual property protections. Exclusivity, taken to its 
logical extreme creates monopoly power, but as courts often point out, monopoly power 
is not itself illegal.44 ‘[T]he challenge for an antitrust court lies in stating a general rule 
for distinguishing between exclusionary acts, which reduce social welfare and 
competitive acts, which increase it’.45 For individual companies, the challenge is to find 
socially beneficial competitive acts which increase exclusivity without running afoul  
of legal limitations. The area in which the tension between affinity and illegality is 
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highest involves exclusive dealing contracts, tying relationships and interference with 
interoperability. 
5.1 Exclusivity in contracts to reduce portability 
When a consumer purchases a software product or enters onto many websites, the 
consumer is required to ‘accept’ the terms of an agreement written for the transaction. 
Such agreements have generally been found to be enforceable.46 While these agreements 
are highly controversial and require that the terms are readily available 
contemporaneously with the transaction, they have pervaded the digital environment.47 
End user license agreements (EULA) and terms of use agreements (TOU) set the terms 
and conditions for access to the content of digital media.48 These license agreements use 
the contractual terms to prohibit reverse engineering or modifications to the software, to 
make all modifications by users the property of the publisher, and to limit access to the 
works.49 In Davidson & Associates v. Jung,50 the Eighth Circuit Court reviewed a tightly 
drafted EULA and found the controls embedded in the EULA complemented the legal 
copyright protections, and the court upheld the agreement.51 
Despite the general applicability, however, these contracts continue to come under 
significant judicial scrutiny. In 2007, the agreement governing the extremely popular 
virtual world, Second Life, was determined to be unenforceable. 52 Second Life has 
grown to become the leading non-gaming virtual world platform, at least in part because 
of its contractual commitment to recognise the intellectual property rights of the users 
who create content in the medium. Avatars, designs, trademarks and other content 
remains the property of the author rather than being treated as a derivative work of the 
website that is transferred by contract to the publisher of the website. Under this policy, 
‘Second Life avatars may now buy, own and sell virtual goods ranging from cars to 
homes to slot machines’.53 In turn, Second Life generates revenue based on the uses to 
which these assets are put. In 2006, attorney Marc Bragg purchased a property in Second 
Life for $300 which gave rise to the dispute. Linden Research took back the disputed 
property, froze Bragg’s Second Life activities, and ‘effectively confiscate[ed] all of the 
virtual property and currency that he maintained on his account with Second Life’.54 
When Bragg brought legal action, Linden moved to compel arbitration. The district 
court sided with Bragg. The court found the terms of service agreement (TOS or 
clickwrap agreement) to be both procedurally and substantively unconscionable.55 
Though procedurally unconscionable, the contract was not automatically unenforceable. 
Under California law, a procedurally unconscionable agreement may be enforceable ‘if 
the substantive terms are reasonable’.56 But courts find that when the party offering the 
agreement retains multiple methods of unilateral redress while offering only binding 
arbitration to the other party, it is an unreasonable, substantively unconscionable 
agreement.57 
The court also found the arbitration fee distribution and venue clauses similarly  
one-sided and substantively unconscionable. As a result, the agreement’s arbitration 
provision was found not enforceable. The decision provides a significant limitation on the 
power of companies to contractually create exclusive dealing, because of the ubiquity 
that these clauses now have in clickwrap agreements involving a wide variety of 
software. Moreover, the ability to reach personal jurisdiction and the willingness to tie 
the advertising to the contractual obligations all combine to increase the accountability 
that publishers and website operators have to their subscribers. 
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Interestingly, the US courts will give the publisher wide latitude to claim the 
intellectual property generated by users of their virtual worlds or software products as the 
property of the publisher, but require much greater scrutiny over quasi-judicial clauses 
that set out the interpretation of the contracts. These contracts make the portability of the 
users’ intellectual property – avatars, characters and potentially music, video or writings 
– harder to move from one product to another. This lack of portability ties the consumer 
to a particular product, enforcing affinity and quasi-exclusivity. Players in these games 
and users of these websites have little concern so long as they remain in the environment, 
but will find it legally and practically challenging to use the work they have done on 
other platforms. 
5.2 Interoperability and digital rights management 
The USA has been a strong advocate of copyright law protections designed to secure 
digital copies from piracy. In the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, the US adopted § 
1201 as codification of treaty obligations enacted in the WIPO Copyright Treaty and 
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty.58 Article 11 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty 
requires that Contracting Parties ‘provide adequate legal protection and effective legal 
remedies against the circumvention of effective technological measures’ to protect 
copyright.59 
What is less explicit is the extent to which interoperability must be allowed under 
Article 11. The parallel EU directive is rather hortatory in its statement that 
‘[c]ompatibility and interoperability of the different systems should be encouraged. It 
would be highly desirable to encourage the development of global systems’.60 In contrast, 
§ 1201(f) provides a specific exemption under US law for reverse engineering for the 
specific purpose of developing interoperability.61 Where the product also includes an 
EULA, however, the publisher or manufacturer can incorporate contractual provisions 
that eliminate the purchaser’s ability to take advantage of their broader legal rights to 
reverse engineer. It remains uncertain whether such a contract would effectively block a 
legitimate competitor’s attempt to utilise a competitor’s product for interoperability. 
Instead, the fear is that the threat of such lawsuits has discouraged innovation and 
interoperability. 
Despite the controversy created by iTunes DRM software and a flurry of legislative 
activity in France, the situation never resulted in a legal obligation by Apple to open its 
proprietary DRM.62 ‘The European Commission does not seem to be too concerned about 
the lack of interoperability of iTunes. According to Charlie McCreevy, ‘if consumers 
want a seamless system that marries the music they buy and the player they listen to – 
why shouldn’t they have it, especially if it doesn’t distort the market or prevent others 
from entering? If people don’t like one product or approach, they will vote with their 
wallets and go elsewhere’.63 This attitude reinforces the reintermediation strategies of 
multinational companies and it may significantly underestimate the cumulative effect of 
the various intermediation strategies on the public. 
5.3 Tying agreements and bundling 
Another of the strategies used to build affinity into exclusivity is the practice of tying or 
bundling products together. The practice of offering discounts on bundled products or 
services may simply pass efficiencies of scale along to the consumer or it may use the 
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market leverage of one product to promote the second product. Under US law, to be 
illegal, the tying arrangement requires the government to establish four elements: ‘first, 
two separate products must exist; second, the defendant directly or practically must 
condition the sale of the tying product on the purchase of the tied product; third, the 
defendant must enjoy leveraging power in the tying product's market; and fourth, the 
practice of tying must foreclose a substantial amount of competition in the tied product’s 
market’.64 Articles 81 and 82 of the Maastricht Treaty65 provide the anti-tying protections 
to the European Union from unrestrained tying relationships. Article 81 specifically 
addresses tying by prohibiting agreements ‘which make the conclusion of contracts 
subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their 
nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such 
contracts’.66 
In the arena of software integration, there has been a great focus on the separation of 
products, such as the integration of Microsoft’s web browser67 or music player,68 but the 
separability of bundled products may be less difficult to identify in other contexts. In the 
USA, Microsoft’s tying activities were not ultimately reviewed.69 The consent decree 
allowed for third party products such as browsers and media players, but did not remove 
Microsoft’s products. In Europe, greater culpability was found, but the results were 
substantially the same.70 The direct and indirect tying created by Apple’s refusal to 
provide interoperability or by Amazon by requiring print-on-demand books be created 
using its subsidiary provide more recent examples of the tying activity that will engender 
customer exclusivity but not trigger antitrust or competition law violations. 
If Apple gains sufficient market power in the defined market of music sales, then the 
refusal to provide interoperability could run afoul of even US law. The comments made 
by Steve Jobs regarding the futility of selling DRM-protected music will reinforce the 
notion that there is not a legitimate pro-competitive reason for creating the restriction. 
Applying these rules more generally, anti-tying legislation provides only marginal 
protection for the consumer. The US notion of economic efficiency has moved well 
beyond fostering new markets and provide companies focused on exclusivity strategies 
wide latitude.71 The European model is somewhat more protective, but the disparate 
treatment of Apple and Microsoft suggest that less difference between the two 
approaches in terms of actual prohibition of corporate conduct. 
5.4 Privacy and data protection 
The approach to US and European privacy protection is far more divergent than it is for 
competition law or copyright. The USA protects only defined categories of data, such as 
student privacy,72 financial services73 and healthcare,74 while providing government 
access under a broad array of federal laws.75 In contrast, Europe has a much broader 
protection for data protection76 which specifies the nature of the uses for which such data 
can be used77 and limitations on the scope of data collection.78 
For purposes of a reintermediation strategy, the lack of systemic processes allows US 
data aggregators and companies to aggressively cross-tabulate the information about 
customers and visitors to its websites. The US companies do not have to specify the 
reasons for collecting or sharing most consumer data. Unless the user is required to 
provide data from a protected category such as healthcare, financial, the company can 
broadly market the consumer data. US data aggregators, therefore, have a much greater 
opportunity to use the mined data to gain the affinity of the customer. The European 
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directives are much more demanding on the companies collecting the data, but this does 
not necessarily mean that it will greatly diminish the ability of the companies that collect 
the data to utilise that data. As demonstrated by companies such as Amazon and Netflix, 
customers are willing to give their consent to allow use of data and are willing to actively 
supply the data. Netflix asks consumers to rate movies to improve Netflix 
recommendations, and users readily provide the information. Provided the consumer has 
an affinity for the company collecting the data, the greater regulatory framework required 
outside the USA creates only a modest barrier. 
Whether in the USA or Europe, therefore, the companies which stand the best 
opportunity to meet their privacy obligations and provide the greatest consumer service 
are those that utilise their own data to provide suggestions to their customers. By keeping 
the data internally, the company is much more likely to be able to acquire the necessary 
unambiguous consent required. The customer who chose to deal with the company is also 
likely to understand the need for the company to use the data. Netflix provides an 
excellent example. By requesting that customers rate all films for the purpose of 
improving recommendations, it is making clear to the customer that the rating data is 
being used to shape the information provided back to the consumer. The heightened 
consent obligation actually create an incentive for corporations to engage their customers 
directly, rather than use intermediaries and risk a loss of access to the information 
provided by those interactions. 
5.5 Concerns over the cumulative effect of on consumer rights 
The ultimate legal concern from reintermediation practices flow from the intersection of 
DRM, contracting practices, bundling arrangements and data use agreements on 
consumer choice. By integrating these tools, companies can build an effective 
reintermediation strategy, but they can also significantly limit the protections traditionally 
afforded to consumers by national law. For example, Sony tested the limits of public 
tolerance when it shipped music CDs with embedded software designed to create DRM 
controls on the listener’s computer.79 The software limited the ability of the consumer to 
rip the music to other formats by adding root kit software and unintentionally adding 
vulnerability to the computer’s security.80 The Federal Trade Commission action was 
based on failure to inform the consumer rather than any public policy prohibition of the 
practice.81 This approach was sufficient to stop the potentially predatory practices of 
Sony but also provides manufacturers the explanation of how to impose additional 
limitations on their customers. 
Courts and legislative bodies must recognise that the various components of 
consumer controls must be viewed in concert rather than in isolation. In some situations, 
US courts are beginning to recognise this need. When a manufacturer attempted to use 
DRM to tie garage door accessories to its garage doors, barring competitors from 
building compatible products,82 the court recognised the need to limit DRM to the 
underlying copyright infringement.83 Section 1201 does not ‘divest the public of the 
property rights that the Copyright Act has long granted to the public’.84 The risk to 
consumers of media products has not gone unnoticed. ‘[I]nformation consumers suffer 
from further vulnerabilities that require even stronger protection’.85 
The recognition that a clickwrap agreement may be procedurally unconscionable and 
therefore enforceable only if fundamentally fair provides a balanced approach and 
increased judicial scrutiny. Such contracts should be reviewed carefully to assure that 
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legal consumer protections – not just arbitration clauses – remain protected. The 
consumer protection policies must take into account the reintermediation strategies of the 
companies, recognise the concerted intersection of copyright, contract and bundling 
practices, and address both the individual concerns and the synergistic impact of these 
practices. Just as the synergies make for stronger reintermediation strategies, the 
synergies must be reviewed for their anti-competitive impact and undue burdens on 
consumers. 
6 Conclusions 
For better or worse, companies will learn from the examples set by Amazon, Apple, 
Microsoft and Google to develop more comprehensive reintermediation strategies. These 
companies will begin to understand that the internet provides ample tools for direct 
communication with the consumer and that traditional supply chains are irrelevant. The 
leaders at reintermediation have looked beyond the physical distribution of their products 
to identify opportunities to expand both richness and reach, significantly increasing the 
relevance of these companies to their customers. In each case, these companies have 
adopted reintermediation strategies focused on creating an essential role for the business 
beyond serving as a source of the product of service. By utilising restrictive end user 
license agreements, proprietary digital rights management systems and taking steps to 
discourage interoperability, these companies make it harder for an existing customer to 
leave. At the same time, these companies use consumer data information and structural 
business approaches to improve customer satisfaction and enhance customer support. As 
such, the customer may be benefiting from these activities and prefer companies with 
robust reintermediation strategies because those are the companies that value customers. 
Dangers also exist, so the cumulative effect of the reintermediation strategies may require 
greater attention to consumer protection and the implications of anticompetitive conduct 
based on the intersection of the various reintermediation techniques. 
While reintermediation is predominantly a business strategy designed to overcome 
the pressures of internet commoditisation and digital piracy, the practice will continue 
influencing the development of contract interpretation, privacy policy and intellectual 
property law. Companies will push to increase the flexibility with which they can employ 
these strategies. The music industry has experienced much of this transition; the 
publishing and motion picture industries are not far behind. Inevitably, these changes will 
influence the distribution of goods and services in every transaction as the richness of 
face-to-face communications is replicated with ubiquitous reach to every potential 
customer in the world. 
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